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ORIGINALISM ALL THE WAY DOWN?
ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD CONSTITUTION.
By John O. McGinnis 1 & Michael B. Rappaport.2
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 2013. Pp. 298,
$39.95 (cloth).
Kurt T. Lash 3
Originalism is a reformist movement in contemporary
American constitutional law. Its practitioners reject modern
interpretive theories such as “living constitutionalism” and call for
the restoration of the foundational understanding of the text.
4
Despite vigorous efforts to discredit the movement, originalism
in the twenty-first century enjoys an increasing number of
5
scholarly advocates and it occupies an essential place in the tool6
box of advocates before American courts. But success has its
costs. As the number of self-identified originalists increase, so do
disputes regarding the proper normative basis for originalism and
the degree to which original understanding ought to control the
resolution of contemporary legal disputes.
In their book, Originalism and the Good Constitution, John
McGinnis and Michael Rappaport offer both a new justification
for originalism and what they believe is a purer form of the theory,
“original methods originalism.” Advocating a “pragmatic”
1. George C. Dix Professor of Constitutional Law, Northwestern University.
2. Hugh and Hazel Darling Foundation Professor of Law and Director of the
Center for the Study of Constitutional Originalism, University of San Diego.
3. Guy Raymond Jones Chair in Law and Director, Program in Constitutional
Theory, History, and Law, University of Illinois College of Law.
4. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60
B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original
Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985).
5. For contemporary works that rely in whole or in part on originalist theory, see
AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998);
JACK BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011); RANDY BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST
CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (updated ed., 2014); KURT T. LASH, THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF AMERICAN
CITIZENSHIP (2014).
6. For recent examples of judicial application of originalist theory, see both the
majority and dissenting opinions in McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 3020 (2010).
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justification for originalism based on the benefits of
supermajoritarian decision-making, McGinnis and Rappaport
insist that judges must apply the text exclusively through the use
of interpretive methods in play at the time of the Founding. When
judges depart from these “original methods,” they (and we) lose
the benefits of supermajoritarian decision-making. This is a
creative and provocative approach to originalism that deserves
serious attention by anyone interested in the expanding corpus of
originalist theory. Even if not successful in their effort to displace
what they call “constructionist originalism” (p. 8), McGinnis and
7
Rappaport have established methodist originalism as an
important denomination in the originalist Reformation.
SUPERMAJORITARIANISM AND THE “GOOD
CONSTITUTION”
Critics of originalism commonly maintain that a robust
application of the theory would leave us with a government
simultaneously underpowered and over-tyrannical. Originalist
courts would invalidate the post-New Deal administrative state,
overrule the equality jurisprudence initiated by Brown v. Board
of Education, and abandon much, if not most, of the individual
rights protections of the Warren Court. Pollution would go
unregulated, the poor unprotected, and the will of the people
here-and-now ignored in favor of the preferences of eighteenth
century slaveholding white males. In short, the consequences of
undiluted originalism would be bad.
McGinnis and Rappaport argue that such criticism is not only
wrong, it is theoretically obtuse. Good faith judicial enforcement
of the original meaning of the Constitution would result in good
consequences, at least most of the time. Had courts consistently
applied an originalist methodology from the country’s beginning,
McGinnis and Rappaport argue, we would have avoided Jim
Crow, Congress would have been granted enumerated power to
regulate the national economy, and individuals would have an
enumerated right to sexual equality (p. 90).
Lest the reader be misled, however, McGinnis and
Rappaport do not believe that it is the substance of law that makes
it “good.” Instead, it is the consequentialist values of stability and
legal predictability that flow from a supermajoritarian
7. “Methodist” originalism is my term, but it is both less awkward than “original
methods originalism” and more appropriate in light of the label imposed by the authors
on “constructionist” originalism.
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decisionmaking that makes law “good.” 8 Supermajoritarian
voting procedures ensure broad public acceptance of norms
intended to remain in place for generations. Participants in such a
process will likely take the long view and entrench basic
protections for all citizens (including their descendants) and not
9
just those who happen to be in power. The likely result is a stable
body of law that maximizes preference satisfaction among the
voting citizenry. These “good” benefits will be enjoyed only if
judges enforce the original textual meaning that triggered
supermajoritarian support in the first place. Judges who apply
non-originalist meanings and methods inevitably introduce
instability and disagreement and, ultimately, place society in a
worse position than would have been the case had relevant
decision-makers followed and enforced the Constitution’s
original meaning.
Although McGinnis and Rappaport argue that the original
Constitution emerged from what was primarily a
10
supermajoritarian process (p. 62), they also acknowledge
supermajoritarian “failures” such as the original exclusion of
blacks and women from the voting public (p. 100). These original
deficiencies, however, were largely remedied through the
adoption of subsequent amendments, such as the Thirteenth,
11
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. It was the federal
government’s failure to properly enforce these amendments that
blocked the immediate good results that would have otherwise
8. See p. 3 (“[S]tringent supermajority rules are likely (and more likely than other
methods, such as judicial fabrications) to generate good constitutional provisions.”).
9. See p. 12 (“Wide support for a constitution helps to create the legitimacy and
allegiance for the nation’s fundamental law that is especially important in a pluralist
country like the United States.”).
10. See also p. 64 (“We see the greatness of the Constitution as largely the result of
the supermajoritarian process that enacted it.”).
11. The authors only briefly address the question of whether the ratification of the
Reconstruction Amendments satisfied the authors’ requirement of supermajoritarian
decision-making. See pp. 69–70 (“While we cannot fully address this issue, we can suggest
how these amendments are best understood to conform to the supermajoritarian
approach.”). The authors defer to the work of Akhil Amar who argues that the southern
states were properly excluded from the amendment process, which, if correct, resulted in
a supermajoritarian ratification by the remaining states (p. 70). Amar’s analysis and
conclusion have been strongly challenged by his Yale Law School colleague, Bruce
Ackerman. See Bruce A. Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737,
1747 n.25 (2007) (responding to Amar’s formalist defense of the adoption of the
Reconstruction Amendments). Given the major role these amendments play in modern
constitutional law, determining whether they were adopted by way of a supermajoritarian
process seems absolutely critical to the authors’ argument. If they were not, then it is hard
to see how the authors can maintain that we currently have a “Good Constitution”
according to their own normative methods. It is somewhat disappointing that the authors
leave the issue unresolved by citing only one side of a vigorous and on-going debate.
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flowed from the adoption of the remedial Reconstruction
Amendments (p. 110).
In support of this claim, the authors rely on a number of
disputed assertions about the original meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment. For example, McGinnis and Rappaport fault the
Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson for failing to recognize that
the Privileges or Immunities Clause protected the equal, if
unenumerated, rights of contract (p. 110). The Supreme Court’s
decision in Plessy to uphold racial segregation, of course, is not
generally criticized because it failed to enforce fundamental
economic rights. Nor is there anything approaching a scholarly
consensus about the original meaning of the Privileges or
12
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. On the other
hand, the authors’ central point is that scholars have been too
quick to assume that originalist interpretations necessarily lead to
morally unacceptable decisions like Plessy. This seems entirely
13
correct.
In fact, McGinnis and Rappaport do a great job explaining
the pragmatic benefits of a supermajoritarian constitutional
process. Originalists of all stripes would do well studying the
opening chapters of The Good Constitution if only to better
appreciate how the actual mechanics of American
constitutionalism generate important contemporary societal
benefits. True, as the authors concede, welfare consequentialism
is a controversial normative theory. Nevertheless, they make a
persuasive case regarding the rule of law benefits that attend
supermajoritarian decision-making, regardless of one’s ultimate
normative justification for following the original meaning of
constitutional text.
COUNTERING THE CONSTRUCTIONISTS
Given the ever-growing variety of scholars embracing the
general theory of originalism, it was inevitable that schools of
originalism would emerge with criticisms of fellow travelers who
are perceived as straying from the true path. In the case of The
Good Constitution, the authors spend a significant portion of the
book contrasting their particular brand of originalism from what
12. Compare BARNETT, supra note 5, with LASH, supra note 5.
13. See for example, the growing consensus that the original meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Bill of Rights. See AMAR, supra note 5;
MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1987). See also LASH, supra note 5.
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they label “constructionist originalism” (p. 139). Exemplified by
the work of scholars like Randy Barnett and Jack Balkin (p.
14
151), constructionist originalism distinguishes the discovery of
15
constitutional meaning from the act of judicial application.
According to constructionists, since judges are not always able to
fully determine the original meaning of a text or discern exactly
how it ought to be applied to a particular legal dispute, they must
often fill the gap between original meaning and current
application by using a judicially constructed rule of interpretation.
According to this approach, the less we know about original
meaning, the more room exists for judges to fill the space with
16
non-originalist judicial doctrine.
To McGinnis and Rappaport, methods of interpretation
derived by anything less that supermajoritarian decisionmaking
threaten to undermine the good consequences otherwise
generated by originalist methodology (p. 153). Not only is the
approach problematic, to McGinnis and Rappaport it is wholly
unnecessary: the same supermajoritarian process that produced
constitutional text also produced a set of original methods for
interpreting the text. As the authors put it:
The constitutional enactors voted to ratify the document based
on their understanding of the text and how they believed it
would be interpreted by subsequent generations. Thus, modern
courts should interpret the Constitution using the same
interpretive methods that the enactors would have used—a
process we call original methods originalism (p. 153).

To McGinnis and Rappaport, meaning and interpretive
method are so closely entwined that you cannot discern the one
without the other. “To embrace originalism without embracing
the enactors’ interpretive rules,” they claim, “is like trying to
decode a message using a different code than the authors of the
message employed” (p. 14). This approach collapses the
distinction between original textual meaning and judicial
application, since the proper methods of interpretation and
application are treated as part of the original “grammar” of the
text. Methodism vanquishes constructionism by completely
erasing the “construction zone” where non-originalist
14. See also BALKIN, supra note 5; BARNETT, supra note 5.
15. For a discussion of originalist theory and the distinction between interpretation
and construction, see Lawrence Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82
FORD. L. REV. 453 (2013).
16. See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 5, at 16–19 (discussing and rejecting “original
expectations originalism”).
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methodology might otherwise apply. This is originalism all the
way down.
If all McGinnis and Rappaport were trying to do is suggest
that the framers expected courts would apply some method of
interpretation, this would seem obviously true. The historical
record at the time of the Founding is full of references to various
theories of textual and constitutional interpretation. The problem
is, for McGinnis and Rappaport to succeed, they must prove the
existence of supermajoritarian agreement on the interpretive
method to be applied to each text of the Constitution. Anything
less either fails the supermajoritarian requirement or leaves room
for non-originalist construction. This is an enormous empirical
burden and one that proves too great for McGinnis and
17
Rappaport to carry.
CONSTITUTIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS AT THE
TIME OF THE FOUNDING
As historians of the period know, there were multitudinous
and often contradictory methods of interpretation in play at the
time of the Founding. 18 This was particularly true when it came to
interpreting the new federal Constitution. The ratification
debates pitted one set of interpretive methods against another as
anti-federalists raised alarms and federalists attempted to put out
19
political fires. These debates continued after ratification, with
one side pulling for a broad interpretation of national power, and
the other calling for what became known as “strict construction”
in order to maintain the remnant sovereign autonomy of the
states.
Here is just one historical example. The text of Article III
declares that “the judicial power shall extend . . . to

17. Arguably, McGinnis and Rappaport concede this burden. At one point, they
state that “determining the meaning of language requires reference to the interpretive
rules and methods that were deemed applicable to the Constitution at the time it was
enacted” (p. 118). Also, “[i]t is our position that originalism requires modern interpreters
to follow the original interpretive rules used by the enactors of the Constitution” (p. 119).
And again, “[o]riginal public meaning also leads to original methods because an informed
and reasonable speaker of the language would have understood the Constitution to be
subject to the interpretive rules applicable to such a document” (p. 121).
18. See generally SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS: ANTI-FEDERALISM &
THE DISSENTING TRADITION IN AMERICA, 1788-1828 (1999); JACK RAKOVE, ORIGINAL
MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1996).
19. For a fine recent discussion of the ratification debates, see PAULINE MAIER,
RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787-1788 (2010).
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controversies . . . between a State and citizens of another State.” 20
Depending on one’s interpretive method, this text may, or may
not, authorize suits for money damages brought by individual
21
citizens against a non-consenting state. Read “liberally,” the text
would include all controversies between a state and a citizen of
22
another state, including suits for money damages. If, however,
one were to apply the interpretive method of “strict
23
construction,” then Article III would authorize only those suits
in which the state was the plaintiff or had otherwise consented to
being sued. Both “liberal” and “strict” methods of interpretation
had their advocates at the time of the Founding, and it is not at all
clear that a supermajority expressly embraced one or the other
when they adopted Article III (along with the rest of the
Constitution).
When the subject came up during the ratification debates,
Federalists promised the state ratifying conventions that the text
of Article III would not be construed to allow individual suits for
money damages against the states. Alexander Hamilton, James
Madison, James Iredell, Rufus King, John Marshall, and others
assured the conventions that delegated power would be strictly
24
construed to avoid just such a result. Despite these assurances,
in Chisholm v. Georgia the Supreme Court ruled 4-1 in favor of
25
state suability. The state legislatures responded to the majority
opinion in Chisholm by quickly adopting the Eleventh
Amendment, an amendment St. George Tucker described as
26
correcting an erroneous interpretation of the Constitution. John
27
Marshall disagreed with Tucker on that point, but the
disagreement just illustrates the problem: perceiving the Eleventh

20. U.S. CONST. art. III, §2.
21. See Alexander Hamilton, Final Version of an Opinion on the Constitutionality of
an Act to Establish a Bank (Feb. 23, 1791), in 8 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON
105 (Harold C. Syrett, et al., eds., 1961–87).
22. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793).
23. See id. at 429 (opinion of Iredell, J.). See also ST. GEORGE TUCKER, 1
BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION
AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA (St. George Tucker ed., The Lawbook Exchange 2006)
(1803).
24. For a detailed discussion of Federalist assurances about strict construction of
Article III, see Kurt T. Lash, Leaving the Chisholm Trail: The Eleventh Amendment and
the Background Principle of Strict Construction, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1577, 1599
(2009).
25. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. 419 (1793).
26. See Lash, supra note 24, at 1683–85, 1685 n.569.
27. See id. at 1678; see also Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 406 (1821).
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Amendment as restoring or amending the original meaning of
Article III depended on one’s method of interpretation.
If we had clear evidence that a supermajority of the framers
or ratifiers embraced one method over the other, then this would
justify judicial application of that method. Unfortunately, we have
nothing near this level of evidence from the extant historical
materials. At most, we have broad agreement that states would
retain their sovereign status following the adoption of the
Constitution, and this might imply something like a “strict
28
construction” approach to texts like Article III. But even this
point remained under significant dispute for decades—indeed, to
this very day.
McGinnis and Rappaport are correct that the original
framers and ratifiers likely assumed that judges would apply some
29
method of interpretation in their liquidation of textual meaning.
But, again, this merely establishes the rather unhelpful point that
the Founding generation broadly agreed that judging sometimes,
in some cases, involved the application of some kind of
interpretive method. For McGinnis and Rappaport to succeed,
they must go beyond this general point and show that a
supermajority of the framers or ratifiers embraced one or more
particular methods of interpretation for the particular texts of our
particular Constitution. Absent such evidence, a judge’s choice of
interpretive method will not be guided by supermajoritarian
agreement, but by her normative theory of constitutional law. But
this is precisely the kind of non-originalist normative choice that
McGinnis and Rappaport reject.
Perhaps recognizing the impossible task of proving express
ratifier reliance on specific rules of construction, McGinnis and
Rappaport suggest that a supermajority of the framers and
ratifiers can be presumed to have accepted the interpretive rules
of common law explicated in treatises such as Blackstone’s
Commentaries (p. 135). Historical scholars of the period would
never accept such a presumption. Despite the continued influence
of the common law in general, and Blackstone’s Commentaries in
particular, the same generation that adopted the Constitution also
challenged the uncritical acceptance of English common law.
American legal theorists at the time of the Founding increasingly
28. See Lash, supra note 24, at 1685–91.
29. See p. 129 (“[T]here is strong evidence that the constitutional enactors would
have assumed that the interpretive rules that applied to all legal documents would also
apply to the Constitution. These rules were applied generally to legal documents, and it is
hard to believe that they would not have been applied to the Constitution”).
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believed that many of the legal and interpretive rules of the
common law were rooted in an ancient system of hereditary
30
sovereigns. To these reformers, many common law rules either
had to be abandoned or significantly modified in a legal system
based on the sovereignty of the people.
For example, St. George Tucker’s 1803 edition of
Blackstone’s Commentaries was a hugely successful and
influential effort to “translate” the rules of English common law
so that they made better sense for a people whose legal system
31
presumed the ultimate sovereignty of the people themselves.
The United States was not just a new and independent legal
entity, the country and its citizens had operationalized a new legal
theory. The status of the government and the role of its courts
were different on American soil, rendering problematic any
wholesale adoption of Blackstonian common law. As historian
Davison Douglas writes:
While serving as a law professor at The College of William and
Mary during the 1790s, Tucker had his students read
Blackstone, but he supplemented that reading with lectures in
which he analyzed the ways that law in the United States—and
specifically Virginia—had departed from English legal
principles as a result of the American Revolution, the Virginia
Constitution, and the United States Constitution. These
lectures were “the first systematic effort by any figure in
American law to describe the contours of the new system
created by the amended Constitution.” Drawing extensively on
his William and Mary lectures, Tucker’s Blackstone included
eight hundred pages of essays on a variety of legal and political
topics and more than one thousand footnotes in which Tucker
examined Blackstone in light of American and Virginian law.
Tucker worried about the effect Blackstone’s Tory sensibilities
30. For a discussion of Founding-era resistance to Blackstone and unreconstructed
principles of common law, see Aaron T. Knapp, Law’s Revolutionary: James Wilson and
the Birth of American Jurisprudence, 29 J. L. & POLITICS 189, 297–99 nn.565–66 (2013).
31. According to Tucker,”[T]he American revolution has formed a new epoch in the
history of civil institutions, by reducing to practice, what, before, had been supposed to
exist only in the visionary speculations of theoretical writers. . . . The world, for the first
time since the annals of its inhabitants began, saw an original written compact formed by
the free and deliberate voices of individuals disposed to unite in the same social bonds . ...
This memorable precedent . . . led the way to that instrument, by which the union of the
confederated states has since been completed, and in which, as we shall hereafter endeavor
to sh[o]w, the sovereignty of the people, and the responsibility of their servants are
principles fundamentally, and unequivocally, established; in which the powers of the
several branches of government are defined, and the excess of them, as well in the
legislature, as in the other branches, finds limits, which cannot be transgressed without
offending against that greater power from whom all authority, among us, is derived; to wit,
the PEOPLE.” TUCKER, supra note 23, Appendix A.
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might have on his students. He thus emphasized to his students
that the American Revolution and its aftermath had produced
a revolution “not only in the principles of our government,” but
in a variety of legal principles, such as the law of inheritance,
that reflected the new nation’s republican values and that
rendered Blackstone an unreliable guide to certain aspects of
32
American law.

St. George Tucker’s “translation” of Blackstone found an
eager audience. Again, according to Douglas,
Tucker’s Blackstone, the first major legal treatise on American
law, was one of the most influential legal works of the early
nineteenth century and the most comprehensive treatise on
American constitutional law until around 1820. Not
surprisingly, it was also one of the legal texts most frequently
cited by the United States Supreme Court and relied upon by
lawyers appearing before the Court during the first few
33
decades of the nineteenth century.

The point here is not that the country had completely
abandoned Blackstone and the methods of the common law—the
very success of Tucker’s “translation” shows they had not. But
that same success indicates that one cannot rely on long-standing
usage at common law as a proxy for supermajoritarian-level
acceptance at the time of the Founding. Although McGinnis and
Rapport cite examples of historical figures who followed some
common law rules (p. 136), they do not undertake a fine-grained,
time-specific analysis of the common law in the United States in
1787. Had they done so, they likely would have noticed the rules
were undergoing both challenge and change, to a degree fatal to
any claim that the rules were so widely known and accepted that
we can presume they were baked into the constitutional text.
The problem of evolving legal principles at the time of the
Founding is especially salient in determining the appropriate
methods for interpreting the text of the federal Constitution. At
one point, McGinnis and Rappaport insist that the “the reader of
the US Constitution would recognize that its meaning depends on
interpretive rules that were generally deemed applicable to
written constitutions of this type” (p. 124). Contra McGinnis and
Rappaport, however, there were no other written constitutions of
“this type.” The very idea of a written, judicially enforceable

32. Davison Douglas, Forward: The Legacy of St. George Tucker, 47 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1111, 1113–14 (2006) (citations omitted).
33. Id. at 1114.

KURT LASH MCGINNIS_DRAFT 2 (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

12/29/2014 3:11 PM

BOOK REVIEWS

159

constitution was something new under the sun in postRevolutionary America. As the theory of popular sovereignty
established itself in post-Revolutionary America, the legitimacy
of state constitutions adopted by anyone other than “the people
themselves” came under fire, with Massachusetts being among
34
the first to submit the document for popular ratification. Even if
the theory of written and enforceable state constitutions had
remained static in the thirteen years between the Revolution and
the Founding (which it did not), it is hard to imagine how
“methods of interpretation” in such a short time could have
evolved and established themselves across every state to such a
degree as becoming part of the meaning of the federal
Constitution.
The authors also maintain that the same supermajority that
adopted the Constitution would have also presumed that the same
methods of interpretation currently applied to state constitutions
also would apply to the federal Constitution. As they put it:
A strong case can also be made that the enactors would have
assumed that many of the interpretive rules applied to state
constitutions would be applied to the federal Constitution. As
the use of the term constitution suggests, the enactors modeled
the federal constitution on the preexisting state constitutions.
While the federal Constitution differed in some respects from
the state constitutions, these differences are more political than
legal (p. 129).

This assertion is even more problematic than the assumed
reliance on Blackstonian common law. If we know anything about
the rules of interpretation in play at the time of the Founding, we
know that the proponents of the Constitution rejected this very
argument. As Federalists repeatedly pointed out, the structure
and theory of the federal Constitution fundamentally differed
35
from that informing the constitutions of the several states. The
34. See GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787,
339–41 (1969).
35. The distinction between proper interpretation of state constitutions and the
federal constitution was key to justifying the omission of a Bill of Rights from the original
proposed Constitution. Where the interpretation of state constitutions presumed
unenumerated police powers (thus the need for express restrictions in the form of a Bill of
Rights), the federal Constitution operated under an assumed reservation of non-delegated
powers (thus no need to protect subjects not expressly placed in the hands of the national
government). As James Wilson explained in his famous Statehouse Speech, “It will be
proper . . . to mark the leading discrimination between the state constitutions and the
Constitution of the United States. When the people established the powers of legislation
under their separate governments, they invested their representatives with every right and
authority which they did not in explicit terms reserve; and therefore upon every question,
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provisions of state constitutions presumed a government of
general (unenumerated) power. Limiting the powers of such
governments required particular restrictions such as those found
in a written Declaration of Rights. Absent such restrictions, state
governments were presumed to have power to enact any
legislation that furthered the health, welfare, or morals of the
community.
The federal Constitution, on the other hand, reflected a very
different theory of constitutional power. When anti-federalists
objected to the omission of a Declaration (or Bill) of Rights, the
Federalists denied that any such Bill was necessary: the federal
Constitution was not the same kind of legal document as state
constitutions and it required different rules of constitutional
interpretation. Powers were presumed retained unless expressly
delegated. As no power over speech or fundamental rights had
been delegated, there was no need to expressly deny such powers
through the addition of an enumerated list of retained rights.
Indeed, adding a Bill of Rights created the danger that the federal
Constitution would be interpreted the same way as state
constitutions, allowing federal authority to fill in any area not
36
placed expressly off-limits by a Bill of Rights. Although
respecting the jurisdiction of the house of assembly, if the frame of government is silent,
the jurisdiction is efficient and complete. But in delegating federal powers, another
criterion was necessarily introduced, and the congressional power is to be collected, not
from tacit implication, but from the positive grant expressed in the instrument of the union.
Hence, it is evident, that in the former case everything which is not reserved is given, but
in the latter the reverse of the proposition prevails, and everything which is not given, is
reserved. . . . In truth then, the proposed system possesses no influence whatever upon the
press, and it would have been merely nugatory to have introduced a formal declaration
upon the subject -- nay, that very declaration might have been construed to imply that
some degree of power was given, since we undertook to define its extent.” James Wilson,
Speech in the State House Yard (Oct. 6, 1787), reprinted in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 167–68 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976).
Wilson’s Statehouse Speech and his explanation regarding the omission of the Bill of
Rights were extremely influential during the ratification debates. See MAIER,
RATIFICATION, supra note 19, at 77–82.
36. Wilson’s distinction between interpretation of state and federal constitutions was
repeated by other federalists throughout the ratification debates. See 4 JONATHAN
ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS OF THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 140–41 (1827) (reporting the remarks of Archibald
Maclaine before the North Carolina convention on July 28, 1788) (“[T]he powers of
Congress are expressly defined; and the very definition of them is as valid and efficacious
a check as a bill of rights could be, without the dangerous implication of a bill of rights.
The powers of Congress are limited and enumerated. . . . It is as plain a thing as possibly
can be, that Congress can have no power but what we expressly give them.”); id. at 142
(reporting the statement of Samuel Johnston before the North Carolina convention on
July 22, 1788) (“A bill of rights may be necessary in a monarchical government, whose
powers are undefined. . . .The Congress cannot assume any other powers than those
expressly given them.”). As James Iredell explained in the North Carolina Ratifying
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McGinnis and Rappaport point to the dispute over the Bill of
Rights as evidence that there were agreed upon methods of
interpretation (p. 127), that particular debate illustrates why we
cannot assume that a supermajority of the Founders believed that
the interpretative methods applicable to the state constitutions
also applied to the federal Constitution.
Even more problematically, the debate over the Bill of
Rights brings into sharp relief the fact that there were no preexisting methods of interpretation applicable to a “federal”
Constitution—no such constitution had ever existed. The
American experiment with constitutionally entrenched
federalism brought forth something new under the sun, and it
required the development of new legal principles to deal with the
inevitable competing claims of state and national governments.
There simply was nothing in the annals of English common law,
or even American state constitutional law, that provided
methodological guidance to courts faced with a politically
37
entrenched division of sovereign authority.
This lack of historical interpretive models left the Founding
generation to their own devices in constructing the proper rules
of constitutional interpretation. Not surprisingly, nationalists such
as Alexander Hamilton and John Marshall insisted that the
federal Constitution should be interpreted in a manner that best
advanced the perceived needs of a single national People. This
approach encouraged a broad interpretation of national power in
order to avoid unanticipated “gaps” in regulatory authority—gaps
that could not be filled by the people themselves (since they
Convention, “Thus a bill of rights might operate as a snare rather than a protection. If we
had formed a general legislature, with undefined powers, a bill of rights would not only
have been proper, but necessary; and it would have then operated as an exception to the
legislative authority in such particulars. It has this effect in respect to some of the American
constitutions, where the powers of legislation are general. But where they are powers of a
particular nature, and expressly defined, as in the case of the Constitution before us, I
think, for the reasons I have given, a bill of rights is not only unnecessary, but would be
absurd and dangerous.” Id. at 149.
37. As James Madison explained, “It has been too much the case in expounding the
Constitution of the U.S. that its meaning has been sought not in its peculiar and
unprecedented modifications of Power; but by viewing it, some through the medium of a
simple Govt. others thru' that of a mere League of Govts. It is neither the one nor the
other; but essentially different from both. It must consequently be its own interpreter. No
other Government can furnish a key to its true character. Other Government present an
individual & indivisible sovereignty. The Constitution of the U.S. divides the sovereignty;
the portion surrendered by the States, composing the federal sovereignty over specified
subjects; the portions retained forming the sovereignty of each over the residuary subjects
within its sphere.” James Madison to Nicholas P. Trist (Feb. 15, 1830), reprinted in 1 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 239 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph P. Lerner eds. 1987).
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lacked any politically operational existence outside of
convention) and which might soon make of the Constitution an
unhelpful if “splendid bauble.” As Hamilton put it in his 1791
defense of the proposed national bank:
[T]he powers contained in a constitution of government,
especially those which concern the general administration of
the affairs of a country, its finances, trade, defence, etc. ought
to be construed liberally, in advancement of the public good.
This rule does not depend on the particular form of a
government or on the particular demarkation of the
boundaries of its powers, but on the nature and objects of
government itself. The means by which national exigencies are
to be provided for, national inconveniences obviated, national
prosperity promoted, are of such infinite variety, extent and
complexity that there must, of necessity be great latitude of
discretion in the selection and application of those means.
Hence consequently, the necessity and propriety of exercising
the authorities intrusted to a government, on principles of
38
liberal construction.

Notice that Hamilton’s method of “liberal construction” is
derived from a theory of constitutional government in general,
not from the U.S. Constitution in particular. According to
Hamilton, all constitutions should be liberally construed in order
to cover all possible contingencies and best advance the public
good. And however broadly state constitutions were construed,
the federal constitution should receive at least as broad a
construction (if not more so) because of all “the variety and extent
of public exigencies, a far greater proportion of which, and far
more critical kind, are objects of national, than of State
39
administration.” Here, Hamilton leaves behind his preratification argument in the Federalist Papers that the theory of
the federal Constitution required a far more circumscribed
40
interpretation of power than that afforded to state constitutions.
38. Alexander Hamilton, Opinion of Alexander Hamilton, on the Constitutionality of
a National Bank, in LEGISLATIVE AND DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE BANK OF THE
UNITED STATES: INCLUDING THE ORIGINAL BANK OF NORTH AMERICA 95, 98–99 (M.
St. Clair Clarke & D.A. Hall eds., Gales & Seaton 1832).
39. Id. at 99.
40. Prior to ratification of the Constitution, Hamilton had written:
But a minute detail of particular rights is certainly far less applicable to a
Constitution like that under consideration, which is merely intended to regulate
the general political interests of the nation, than to a constitution which has the
regulation of every species of personal and private concerns. If, therefore, the
loud clamors against the plan of the convention, on this score, are well founded,
no epithets of reprobation will be too strong for the constitution of this State. But
the truth is that both of them contain all which, in relation to their objects, is
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If anything, Hamilton now tilts towards the idea that the
federal Constitution ought to be construed more broadly than
state constitutions.
Washington’s Attorney General Edmund Randolph rejected
Hamilton’s method of interpretation on the grounds that it failed
to account for the particular context of the United States
Constitution. According to Randolph:
Governments having no written constitution may, perhaps,
claim a latitude of power not always easy to be determined.
Those which have written constitutions are circumscribed by a
just interpretation of the words contained in them. Nay,
farther; a legislature, instituted even by a written constitution,
but without a special demarkation of powers, may, perhaps, be
presumed to be left at large, as to all authority which is
communicable by the people . . . Essentially otherwise is the
condition of a legislature whose powers are described. An
example of the former is in the State Legislatures; of the latter,
in the Legislature of the Federal Government, the
characteristic of which has been confessed by Congress, in the
twelfth amendment, to be, that it claims no powers which are
not delegated to it. . . . [W]hen we compare the modes of
construing a State and the Federal constitution, we are
admonished to be stricter with regard to the latter, because
there is a greater danger of error in defining partial, than
41
general powers.

reasonably to be desired.
I go further, and affirm that bills of rights, in the sense and to the extent in which
they are contended for, are not only unnecessary in the proposed Constitution,
but would even be dangerous. They would contain various exceptions to powers
which are not granted; and, on this very account, would afford a colorable pretext
to claim more than were granted. For why declare that things shall not be done
which there is no power to do? Why, for instance, should it be said that the liberty
of the press shall not be restrained, when no power is given by which restrictions
may be imposed? I will not contend that such a provision would confer a
regulating power; but it is evident that it would furnish, to men disposed to usurp,
a plausible pretense for claiming that power. They might urge with a semblance
of reason that the Constitution ought not to be charged with the absurdity of
providing against the abuse of an authority which was not given, and that the
provision against restraining the liberty of the press afforded a clear implication
that a power to prescribe proper regulations concerning it was intended to be
vested in the national government. This may serve as a specimen of the numerous
handles which would be given to the doctrine of constructive powers, by the
indulgence of an injudicious zeal for bills of rights. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at
513–14 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,1961).
41. Edmund Randolph, Opinion of Edmund Randolph, Attorney General of the
United States, to President Washington, in LEGISLATIVE AND DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES: INCLUDING THE ORIGINAL BANK OF NORTH
AMERICA, supra note 38, at 86–87.
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Randolph placed the U. S. Constitution in a particular historical
context, having been brought into being by pre-existing state
governments of general police powers and agreed to only because
the national government would be one of limited particular
powers. Not all constitutions were alike, and different
constitutions called for different methods and rules of
interpretation. Hamilton was simply wrong (or purposefully
obtuse) to suggest that the methods of interpreting state
Constitutions also applied to the historically unique federal
Constitution. Nor was this post-hoc spin: Randolph made the
same point during the Virginia Ratifying Convention:
Now is there not a demonstrable difference between the
principle of the State Government and the General
Government? There is not a word said in the state government
of the powers given to it, because they are general. But in the
general Constitution, its powers are enumerated. Is it not then
fairly deducible, that it has no power but what is expressly given
it? For if its powers were to be general, an enumeration would
42
be needless.

James Madison agreed with Randolph that the peculiar
circumstances giving rise to the federal Constitution called for
different interpretations of federal and state constitutional
powers. According to Madison, “[t]he powers delegated by the
proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and
defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are
43
numerous and indefinite.” Similarly, in a speech delivered prior
to the adoption of the Bill of Rights, Madison reminded the
House of Representatives that the ratifiers were promised a
narrow construction of federal constitutional power—a “rule of
44
construction” arising out of the nature of the document itself.
The competing interpretive strategies of Founders like
Hamilton and Madison famously clashed in the debates over the
Bank of the United States. Faced with disagreeing advisors,
President Washington chose Hamilton over Madison. The former
General, of course, shared the nationalist instincts of military
colleagues like Hamilton and Marshall, and later sided with them

42. Edmund Randolph, Edmund Randolph in the Virginia Ratifying Convention
(June 17, 1788), in THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION 1348 (John Kaminsk, Gaspare Salidino, et al. eds., 1993).
43. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, supra note 40, at 292.
44. JAMES MADISON, Speech Opposing the Bank of the United States (June 8, 1789),
in JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 482, 489 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999).
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in support of federal power to pass the Alien and Sedition Acts.45
Rejected by an electorate convinced they had overplayed their
regulatory hand, the Federalists lost control of the political
branches in the elections of 1800. This left the judiciary the last
redoubt for Founding-era nationalism and John Marshall made
46
the most of it with decisions like McCulloch v. Maryland and
47
Gibbons v. Ogden. What we tend to forget, however, is how
controversial those decisions were when first handed down. James
Madison, for example, rejected Marshall’s reasoning in
48
McCulloch v. Maryland, and the Chief Justice found himself
49
having to defend his opinion in a series of anonymous essays.
This is not to suggest that one side or the other in the Bank
50
debate had the better interpretive theory—at least not here.
Instead, this brief sketch of Founding-era interpretive debates is
meant to illustrate how problematic it is to assert, as do McGinnis
and Rappapport, that supermajoritarian agreement on “original
interpretive methods” can fully close the gap between textual
meaning and judicial construction.
CONCLUSION
Originalism and the Good Constitution is an excellent book
that both defends originalism (properly done) and presents a
wealth of evidence indicating that sometimes and in some ways
legal texts originally were read through the lens of interpretive
methodology. This alone makes for a valuable contribution to
legal historical literature. What the authors fail to recognize,
however, is that the proper methods of constitutional
interpretation were not only under-resolved at the time of the
Founding, they were the subject of heated and on-going debate.
McGinnis and Rappaport have given us good reason to strive for
supermajoritarian agreement whenever possible, and good reason
to preserve that agreement until it is superseded by another
45. For a discussion of George Washington’s role in disseminating defenses of the
Alien and Sedition Acts, see Kurt Lash & Alicia Harrison, Minority Report: John Marshall
and the Defense of the Alien and Sedition Acts, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 435 (2007).
46. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819).
47. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824).
48. JAMES MADISON, Detached Memoranda, in JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS, supra
note 44, at 745, 754–56.
49. See JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND (Gerald
Gunther ed., 1969).
50. But see KURT T. LASH, THE LOST HISTORY OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT (2009)
(presenting historical evidence strongly suggesting that Madison had the more accurate
understanding of the original meaning of federal power).
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“speaking of the people.” Methodism cannot, however, give us
agreement where none existed. Different founders proposed
different methods of constitutional construction, each reflecting a
51
different normative theory of the new federal Constitution. This
dispute cannot be resolved by fiat application of interpretive
methodology or recourse to an anachronistic reliance on the
common law; it requires the application of normative theory. This
is not the result of a temporary gap in our historical knowledge. It
is history itself that tells us that originalism cannot go all the way
down.

51. No doubt, some theories were more in step with the ratifiers’ understanding than
others. In fact, I believe it may be possible to establish something like original
supermajoritarian acceptance of normative political theories such as popular sovereignty.
But even so, the implications this would have for proper interpretation of the Constitution
depends on the application of normative theory (in this case, popular sovereignty), and not
an application of original textual meaning.

